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I. INTRODUCTION
In the Supreme Court’s seminal 1975 decision, Goss v. Lopez, the
Court held:
[D]ue process requires, in connection with a suspension of 10 days or less, that
the student be given oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he
denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an
opportunity to present his side of the story.1

* Perry A. Zirkel, University Professor of Education and Law, Lehigh University.
** Assistant High School Principal, Southern Lehigh School District. Graduate
student, Lehigh University.
1. 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975). In contrast to suspensions of ten days or less, the
Court only addressed the application of Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process
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In his dissent to the Goss decision, writing on behalf of three other
members of the Court, Justice Powell countered:
The Court holds for the first time that the federal courts, rather than educational
officials and state legislatures, have the authority to determine the rules applicable
to routine classroom discipline of children and teenagers in the public schools.
It justifies this unprecedented intrusion into the process of elementary and
secondary education by identifying a new constitutional right: the right of a
student not to be suspended for as much as a single day without notice and a due
process hearing either before or promptly following the suspension.2

The majority’s holding and the dissent’s criticism provide the foundational
framework for the continuing rhetoric and more recent research concerning
procedural constraints on student suspensions in public schools.
The purpose of this Article is to provide a systematic synthesis of the
myriad state procedural due process provisions for suspensions of one to
ten days. The results will contribute to determining whether federal
courts, as compared with state legislatures, are the appropriate arena for
resolving any perceived problems.
II. THE RHETORIC AND RESEARCH
Criticism of the Goss ruling began in the wake of Justice Powell’s
dissent3 and continues to the present day.4 During this time, the mass
media,5 political spokespersons,6 special interest groups,7 and education

to lengthier exclusions with this brief dictum: “Longer suspensions or expulsions for the
remainder of the school term, or permanently, may require more formal procedures.” Id.
at 584.
2. Id. at 585 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell reasoned that Ohio’s statute,
which required parents to be provided with written notice of the suspension and the
reasons for the suspension within twenty-four hours, was amply sufficient—and possibly
superior to the majority’s constitutional ruling—to avoid the risk of arbitrary
administrative action. Id. at 596.
3. See, e.g., David L. Kirp, Proceduralism and Bureaucracy: Due Process in the
School Setting, 28 STAN. L. REV. 841, 863–64 (1976); Leon Letwin, After Goss v. Lopez:
Student Status as Suspect Classification?, 29 STAN. L. REV. 627, 662 (1977); J. Harvie
Wilkinson III, Goss v. Lopez: The Supreme Court as School Superintendent, 1975 SUP.
CT. REV. 25, 46.
4. See, e.g., RICHARD ARUM, JUDGING SCHOOL DISCIPLINE: THE CRISIS OF MORAL
AUTHORITY 38, 63 (2003); Richard Arum & Doreet Preiss, From the Schoolhouse to the
Courthouse: School Discipline and the Law, in FROM BROWN TO BONG HITS: ASSESSING
A HALF CENTURY OF JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN EDUCATION (Joshua Dunn & Martin
West eds., forthcoming 2009); Julie Underwood, Commentary, The 30th Anniversary of
Goss v. Lopez, 198 EDUC. L. REP. 795, 798–803 (2005); Richard Arum, For Their Own
Good: Limit Students’ Rights, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2003, at A17; George F. Will,
Schools Beset by Lawyers and Shrinks, WASH. POST, June 15, 2000, at A33.
5. See, e.g., ELLEN JANE HOLLINGSWORTH ET AL., SCHOOL DISCIPLINE: ORDER AND
AUTONOMY 114 (1984) (citing negative predictions in education publications such as
Kirp, supra note 3, and Wilkinson, supra note 3). For an example of the press’s
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publications8 reinforced the perception of Goss and its lower court
progeny as disabling school discipline. Recently, though, a counterbalancing
view has started to emerge. For example, in her article commemorating
the thirtieth anniversary of the Goss decision, Julie Underwood initially
followed the lead of the Powell dissent, commenting that “[b]y making
student discipline a constitutional issue, by elevating it to a ‘federal
issue,’ the court has left educators fumbling away through their daily
disciplinary dealings with students wondering and working at their
peril.”9 However, despite this contention, Underwood at least partially
recognized that the ultimate problem is a matter of state law: “Certainly
the three minute due process [outlined in Goss] is still within
constitutional limits. Since control of the schools rests in the hands of
state legislatures, it would be up to them to enact such [limited
suspension requirements] in their states.”10

sensationalizing and selectively covering suspension and expulsion due process cases,
see Perry A. Zirkel, The Midol Case, 78 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 803, 803–04 (1997).
6. David Schimmel & Richard Williams, Does Due Process Interfere with School
Discipline?, 68 HIGH SCH. J. 47, 48 (1985) (referencing Gary Bauer, the former presidential
assistant who was then-Chairman of the Federal Working Group on School Violence and
Discipline, and his belief that Goss “deprive[s] school administrators of the tools they
need to control school violence”).
7. The current leading organization on this subject is Common Good. See, e.g.,
PUBLIC AGENDA, “I’M CALLING MY LAWYER”: HOW LITIGATION, DUE PROCESS AND
OTHER REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS ARE AFFECTING PUBLIC EDUCATION 11 (2003),
http://commongood.org/assets/attachments/96.pdf; see also Perry A. Zirkel, Paralyzing
Fear? Avoiding Distorted Assessments of the Effect of Law on Education, 35 J.L. &
EDUC. 461, 466–70 (2006) (scrutinizing Common Good’s research studies). For a
summary of the previous efforts of other such interest groups, see, for example, Perry A.
Zirkel, Commentary, The Coverdell Teacher Protection Act: Immunization or Illusion?,
179 EDUC. L. REP. 547, 547–51 (2003). For a more recent forum that included finger
pointing at Goss, see Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Policy Research, From Brown to “Bong
Hits”: Assessing a Half-Century of Judicial Involvement in Education (Oct. 15, 2008),
http://www.aei.org/events/eventID.1746/event_detail.asp.
8. Henry Lufler, Jr., The School of Law Litigation Explosion: A Specious
Generalization 1–2 (Nov. 1988) (unpublished paper presented at the annual conference
of the National Organization on Legal Problems of Education, on file with author)
(attributing this reinforcing tendency to a slowness in education law commentators’
recognition of changes in litigation patterns).
9. Underwood, supra note 4, at 803.
10. Id. at 805–06. Underwood also partially hit the target via a shotgun-like
accusation against state legislatures and “the state agencies, the school boards, the
administrators, and even the courts [for] expand[ing] the minimal due process set forth in
Goss, making the process much more complex and legalistic than originally set out by
the Court.” Id. at 798.
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A pair of recent studies successively found that the procedural
constraints on student suspensions were more a matter of state law than
the Goss decision. In the first study, Youssef Chouhoud and Perry Zirkel
empirically analyzed the frequency and outcomes of Goss progeny,
defined as lower court rulings based on procedural due process (PDP)
specific to school student suspensions and expulsions.11 They found that
the frequency of these rulings increased from 1986 to 2000 and then
leveled off from 2000 to 2005, but that during this entire period, the
outcomes overwhelmingly favored school districts, and the relatively
few student victories were largely limited to rulings based on state laws
that expanded the Goss holding.12 The authors concluded:
[C]ontrary to the position of the various commentators and the mass media,
Goss is not responsible for a dramatic expansion of students’ PDP rights.
Although the Goss dissent was partially correct to the extent that the lower court
progeny has amounted to a rising tide, although not a flood, the results of this
study disprove the dissent’s accompanying prediction of judicial activism. The
primary source of any expansion of the Goss decision is not the judiciary, from
the Goss Court to the federal and state courts that have interpreted its decision,
but state codes, either in the form of legislation or regulation.13

In a follow-up analysis, Chouhoud and Zirkel found that (1) federal
law rulings—those based on Fourteenth Amendment PDP, which was
the fulcrum for Goss—were significantly more skewed in favor of
school districts than were state law rulings; (2) rulings for suspensions—
which are also more closely connected to Goss—were significantly more
skewed in favor of school districts than were rulings for expulsions; and
(3) federal rulings—as compared with state law rulings—for suspensions
were significantly more skewed in favor of school districts, and none of
these “pure” Goss rulings were conclusively in favor of the plaintiff
student.14 As a result, the authors of the study recommended, inter alia,
“[f]ollow-up research to provide systematic data as to which state laws
merely codify the Goss holding for suspensions and the extent to which
the others expand it.”15
This study is intended as the recommended follow-up, and it provides
a systematic survey of state laws for Goss suspensions—those of ten

11. Youssef Chouhoud & Perry A. Zirkel, The Goss Progeny: An Empirical Analysis,
45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 353, 354–63 (2008). For the specific scope of their sample, see
id. at 363–66. They started their case coverage in 1986 because previous PDP studies
had found that Goss had not led to an explosion of litigation and that the outcomes did
not move at all in favor of students. Id. at 358–59 (citing Lufler, supra note 8, at 5).
12. Id. at 378, 381–82.
13. Id. at 382 (footnotes omitted).
14. Perry A. Zirkel & Youssef Chouhoud, The Goss Progeny: A Follow-Up
Outcomes Analysis, 13 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2009).
15. Id.
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days or less—in terms of their procedural requirements. The entries in
the tabular analysis differentiate between codifications and expansions
of the Goss requirements.
III. METHOD
In light of the various requirements for procedural due process that
each state provides through its legislation or regulation, it is important
first to establish the specific scope of this survey. In limiting the study
to Goss suspensions, state law procedural requirements for removals of
more than ten days—whether termed “suspensions” or “expulsions”—
have been excluded. Similarly, in limiting the study to Goss protections,
substantive state law provisions for suspensions of up to ten days—the
specific grounds for such suspensions and the requirements for alternative
education placements or the right to make up work—have also been
excluded.16 Additionally, the study was limited to suspensions from school,
thus excluding state law provisions concerning in-school suspensions,
teacher-imposed removals from class, and timeouts. 17 Finally, and
also in line with Goss, the study’s scope was limited to regular education
in public school settings, thereby excluding the specialized procedural
protections under state and federal law for removals of students with
disabilities.18
Next, within the scope of the study, a variety of search strategies
ensured comprehensive coverage. Specifically, the primary sources of
the study’s search were (1) the websites for state education agencies and
state legislatures; (2) the “Recent State Policies/Activities” feature of the
16. See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:16-7.2(a)(5) (2008) (requiring that
suspended students be provided make up work); TEXAS EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 37.0051,
37.008, 37.011 (Vernon 2006 & Supp. 2008) (requiring placement in disciplinary or
juvenile justice alternative education programs). Other states enacted special substantive
requirements for suspensions. See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:16-7.2(a)(4) (2007)
(mandating supervision of the student while waiting for the student’s parent to remove
the student from school during the school day); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-391(b) (2007)
(containing provisions for textbooks, homework, and tests).
17. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-738(b), (c) (2005) (teacher removals from
class); 22 PA. CODE § 12.7 (2009) (in-school suspensions).
18. For the relevant regulatory requirements and case law on the federal level, see,
for example, Perry A. Zirkel, Discipline of Students with Disabilities: A Judicial Update,
235 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2008), and Perry A. Zirkel, Suspensions and Expulsions of Students
with Disabilities: The Latest Requirements, 214 EDUC. L. REP. 445 (2007), and see also
Perry A. Zirkel, Suspensions and Expulsions Under Section 504: A Comparative
Overview, 226 EDUC. L. REP. 9 (2008).
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Education Commission of the States for “Safety/Student Discipline—
Expulsion/Suspension”;19 and (3) the Westlaw database for supplementation
and verification.20
Finally, a comprehensive table—provided herein as the Appendix—
served to synthesize the variations of the Goss theme within the specific
boundaries of the study. The first two columns follow the Goss
foundational framework of notice and hearing, with the entries “x”
representing explicit codifications of the associated Goss requirements
(for example, oral notice of the charges and a conditional hearing if the
student denies the charges as the minimum).21 A blank entry for the
notice and hearing columns specific to students is an entirely implicit
indication of the same minimum level of procedural protection, given the
Constitution-based effect of the Supreme Court’s unchanged decision.22
For the first two columns, an unshaded entry of “x” represents a
similar, relatively low level of procedural obligation beyond Goss, such
as oral notice to the student’s parents, the school district superintendent,
or both, whereas an “X” represents a more formal level of procedural
obligation beyond the Goss minimum, such as the required addition or
alternative of written notice,23 or a hearing not conditioned on the student’s
denial.24 The final three columns in the Appendix represent further and
sometimes much more significant additions to the Goss procedural
prerequisites, with the “X” entries for the “Additional Levels” column
meriting special attention.25 The other more limited entry variations
19. See Educ. Comm’n of the States, Recent State Policies/Activities, http://www.
ecs.org/ecs/ecscat.nsf/WebTopicView?OpenView&count=-1&RestrictToCategory=Safety/
Student+Discipline--Expulsion/Suspension (last visited Apr. 23, 2009).
20. In the few cases in which a Westlaw search did not reveal an otherwise
referenced provision or the particular provision was difficult to interpret, a state
education law expert was e-mailed for assistance. See infra notes 52, 72, 89, 176. For
example, in the Texas law, the definition of suspension—a removal of one to three days,
with removals beyond three days termed “expulsions”—is distinguishable from its
meaning in most states. See infra note 176.
21. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
22. In contrast, as shown in the key accompanying the table presented on the title
page of the Appendix, a bracketed entry designates some other implied entry based
indirectly on the language of—as contrasted with silence in—the state law. See infra
notes 59, 69 and accompanying table.
23. Where the statute or regulation provided for “oral or written notice,” the entry
is only “x,” which corresponds to the same optional—rather than required—written
notice in Goss. Where the state law provided for written notice rather than, or as a required
addition to, oral notice, the entry in the Notice column is “X” or “x, X,” respectively.
24. Inasmuch as the Appendix provides for two Hearing columns corresponding to
the two required elements of the hearing referenced in Goss, the entries may vary as to
whether the explanation of the evidence or the student’s side of the story is expressly
conditional on the student’s denial of the charges.
25. For example, Pennsylvania provides for two levels of suspension: one to three
days and four to ten days. See infra note 162. The entries in the Appendix for Pennsylvania
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are explained in the introduction to the Appendix. The process of reducing
the pertinent language of the relevant state laws, which vary in their
clarity and complexity, to these symbolic representations entails interpretation
and approximation that cautions against reliance on the individual tabular
entries without examining the cited legal provisions themselves.
IV. RESULTS
An examination of the Appendix reveals that express codifications of
the Goss minimums—designated by a shaded “x” in the “Notice” and
“Hearing” columns—are relatively infrequent. Looked at horizontally,
that is, row by row, the Appendix shows (1) that seven state laws are
entirely silent on the issue, thereby implicitly incorporating, or at least
not adding, any procedural protections beyond the constitutional
minimum of Goss;26 and (2) that approximately an additional ten states’
laws only include negligible additions to Goss.27 Thus, approximately
thirty-three states have statutes or regulations that notably extend beyond
the procedural due process requirements of Goss.28
The “Notice” columns in the Appendix reveal that the most common
procedural additions to Goss are notification to the parent (n~25) and
notification to the superintendent (n~12),29 with several of these state
laws adding specifications for the contents, timing, and form of this
notification.30 In addition, approximately five state laws specify a minimum
of written notice to the student, whereas Goss provided for the alternatives
correspond to the procedural requirements for the first level, which is for removals of up
to three days. See infra notes 161, 162. For suspensions of four to ten days, the
regulations additionally require the school to provide an informal conference among the
student, the parent, and the principal within the first five days of the suspension. See
infra note 162. This “hearing” must include the right to question witnesses present
and to produce witnesses on the student’s behalf. See infra note 162.
26. These states are Alabama, Delaware, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, New
Hampshire, and North Dakota.
27. Although “negligible” is only an estimation, these states are Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, Iowa, Massachusetts, Montana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and
Vermont.
28. The gradations of “negligibly” and “notably” are not objectively distinguishable.
Thus, the respective numbers of states in each category are, to a limited extent, only
approximations.
29. These numbers are only approximations because they do not include the partial
entries.
30. As unusual additions, Utah’s law requires notice, upon request, to the noncustodial
parent, and West Virginia requires notice to the school’s faculty senate. See infra notes
180, 194.
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of oral or written notice, and three states require notice to the school
board.31
The “Hearing” and “Other Hearing Rights” columns of the Appendix
show that the most common procedural additions to Goss are unconditional
opportunity for the student’s side of the story (n~20), accompanied in
approximately half of these states with a corresponding unqualified
school official’s obligation—without the triggering condition of the
student denying the charges32—to explain the evidence.33 Less frequently,
state laws provide the right to appeal to the superintendent (n~7), the
board (n~5), or both (n~1).
Finally, the “Additional Levels” column provides the most significant
expansion of Goss rights by limiting the application of Goss to a
substantially lower ceiling than ten days and adding stronger PDP rights
for the remaining period of suspension. The most notable variations, in
order of strength, are as follows: (1) Minnesota provides limited additional
protections for suspensions of six consecutive and eleven cumulative
days;34 (2) Texas and Pennsylvania provide an intermediate level of PDP
for suspensions of three to ten and four to ten days, respectively;35 and
(3) California, Nebraska, and New York effectively redraw the Goss tenday boundary between suspensions and expulsions at five days.36 As an
unusual variation, Tennessee’s law requires the principal to develop a
behavior improvement plan for the student upon a suspension of six to
ten days.37 Finally, illustrating the blurry boundary between procedural
and substantive requirements, the recently amended Connecticut law
limits out-of-school suspensions of one to ten days to circumscribed
serious safety grounds, thus effectively collapsing the Goss ceiling to
zero days for the bulk of disciplinary violations.38
V. DISCUSSION
Almost two-thirds of the states have statutes or regulations that extend
notably beyond the procedural due process requirements of Goss for out31. Again, this approximation does not include the partial entries.
32. See supra text accompanying note 1.
33. As with the prior frequencies, these numbers are conservative approximations,
which do not include partial entries. As notable additions, Hawaii, see infra note 84,
New York, see infra note 146, and Washington, see infra note 188, provide the
opportunity for the parent’s participation, and unusually, California calls for the
participation “whenever practicable, [of] the teacher, supervisor, or [referring] school
employee,” CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48911(b) (West 2006).
34. See infra note 119 and accompanying table.
35. See infra notes 162, 179 and accompanying table.
36. See infra notes 65, 134, 147 and accompanying table.
37. See infra note 175.
38. See infra note 70 and accompanying table.
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of-school suspensions of one to ten days. Most often, states add to the
basic requirement of notice by requiring recipients beyond the student,
although states also extend beyond Goss in terms of the content, timing,
and form of the requisite notification. Although not overwhelmingly
onerous, each of these additional requirements represents additional
inconvenience and—in cases of noncompliance—legal vulnerability for
the administrative disciplinarian. On the other side of the balance,
these requirements provide additional protection and, at least potentially,
fairness for the affected student. The most common alteration to the
hearing procedure articulated in Goss is the removal of the condition
antecedent to a hearing, that is, the student’s denial of the noticed
charges. This alteration is common because the difference between
providing an explanation of the evidence and giving the student an
opportunity for rebuttal is not particularly significant; most legislatures
likely did not notice the difference and most courts are likely to regard
the difference as de minimis. In contrast, the effects of adding a right of
review at the superintendent’s level, the board’s level, or both, are akin to
those of the varying supplemental notice requirements. These additional
levels, which exist in approximately six to eight states’ laws, are the most
significant extensions of Goss and largely have the effect of reducing the
ten-day ceiling of its procedural requirements.39 These additional levels
therefore trigger the more extensive procedural requirements that the Goss
reasoning and state law codifications have reserved for longer exclusions,
herein referred to generically as “expulsions.”
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the value of experimentation
among the states, within constitutional boundaries, as one of the benefits
of federalism.40 The Goss Court provided a relatively non-onerous procedural
rule as the constitutional minimum for short-term suspension of students
as one of the primary tools of school discipline.41 Beyond this minimum,
the substantive requirements that may—as Connecticut’s recent amendments

39. See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text, along with the entries under
“Additional Levels” in the Appendix, infra pp. 354–55.
40. See, e.g., Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1808 (2008); Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2786 n.28 (2007)
(Thomas, J., concurring); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 418 (1999);
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 264–65 (1983); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S. 596, 617 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis’s dissenting
opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310–11 (1932), is usually
credited with the conception of states as laboratories.
41. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581–83 (1975).
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illustrate42—reduce the availability of this disciplinary alternative are
properly a matter for state experimentation. This Article’s systematic
canvassing of current state variations thus serves more than one purpose.
First, these survey data help inform states of what others are doing so
that they can see what may be considered in, and customized to, their
respective jurisdictions. Second, this study builds on predecessor studies
to provide an added basis and direction for future research.43 For example, a
useful follow-up study would be to determine the relationship, if any,
between these statutory findings and the suspension case law in the previous
two studies. More specifically, it would be beneficial to determine if
those jurisdictions that have experienced the most frequent and least
district-friendly decisions correspond closely to the state laws that this
study revealed as having the most significant extensions of the Goss
requirements. As a second example, this analysis provides the template for a
systematic canvassing of state laws with regard to expulsions, generically
referred to here as exclusions of more than ten days.
Finally, this study adds to the evidence from its pair of predecessors
that the characterization of Goss and its judicial progeny as disabling the
discipline of school students is a misconception.44 Rather, state authorities
that forge binding rules in the form of legislation and regulations, with
due allowance for further experimentation and variation at the local
level, are the primary—and proper—sources of the procedural and
substantive requirements for student suspensions. In this modern era of
judicial deference rather than activist intervention in public school student
cases,45 state policymaking is both necessary and proper to balance the
competing interests, which include minimizing the risk of error that
ultimately may harm both the individual and the institution.

42. See infra note 70 and accompanying table.
43. See supra notes 11–15 and accompanying text.
44. See supra notes 3–8 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Anastasia D’Angelo & Perry A. Zirkel, An Outcomes Analysis of
Student-Initiated Education Litigation: A Comparison of 1977–1981 and 1997–2001
Decisions, 226 EDUC. L. REP. 539, 550–53 (2008); Perry A. Zirkel, National Trends in
Education Litigation: Supreme Court Decisions Concerning Students, 27 J.L. & EDUC.
235, 242 (1998). One of the factors that appeared to influence the courts was the
increased concern with safety and security in the schools, particularly in the wake of
Columbine and similar well-publicized incidents within and beyond the schools. See,
e.g., Chouhoud & Zirkel, supra note 11, at 379 (citing Robert C. Cloud, Due Process
and Zero Tolerance: An Uneasy Alliance, 178 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 17 (2003)). Whether the
various states’ legislatures and their education agencies will accord this interest the same
weight and direction, especially in comparison to competing interests—such as the value
of using alternate disciplinary mechanisms for the limited level of student conduct
violations that are typically grounds for short-term suspensions—is an open question left
to the policymaking function of these nonjudicial branches of government.
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VI. APPENDIX
OVERVIEW OF PDP PROVISIONS OF STATE LAWS
FOR OUT-OF-SCHOOL SUSPENSIONS OF
ONE TO TEN DAYS46
The Method section explains the basic format and entries for this tabular
analysis.47 In addition, some entries have these specialized features, which
are explained in the respective footnotes:
“( )”
“[ ]”
“+”
“?”

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

=
=
=
=

implied via indirect language48
partial, or limited, variation49
limited addition50
open question51

The entries in the tabular analysis are current as of July 1, 2008.
See supra Part III.
See, e.g., infra notes 55, 56.
See, e.g., infra notes 59, 69.
See, e.g., infra notes 62, 63.
See, e.g., infra notes 56, 64.
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X=unconditional

Explanation

Bd.

Supt.
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Parent
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Alabama52
Alaska53

X

Arizona54
Arkansas

(x)55

58

66

Colorado

Connecticut

77

Georgia

(x/X?)64

X65
x67

X

69

X

83

89

x, X
(X)

78

x

Indiana98

x, X74 [X]75
(X)

79

[x]

X

X

X

x, X

84

80

(x)

Kentucky103

90

x

X

Iowa99
Kansas101

x+
x

X 95
x

85

X

x

Illinois94
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X+63

x

70

x71

72

Florida73

Idaho

X+62

x
68

Hawaii

x, [X]

x, X61 x

x

x57
59

X

California60

Delaware

(x?)56

91

[X]

X102
x

X
X

X

x82

(x)

86

x+

92

[X]

[X]96

X97

x

X

X

X

x

X

X100
x,

x76
81

X

87

X

93
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Louisiana104
Maine

x105

x

X

X

X

[x]108

[x]109

[x]110

[x+]111

106

Maryland107

x112
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52. Alabama regulations define suspensions but do not specify the prerequisite
procedural requirements, inferably leaving such matters to local school board policy.
ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 290-3-1-.02 (2008). The authors acknowledge with appreciation
the assistance of Doris McQuiddy for confirmation that Alabama school districts develop
their policies and procedures for suspensions as well as expulsions. E-mail from Doris
McQuiddy, Educ. Specialist, Ala. Dep’t of Educ., to Perry A. Zirkel, Professor of Educ.
and Law, Lehigh Univ. (May 29, 2008) (on file with second author).
53. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 06.060 (2009).
54. Except for the implied notice requirement, see infra note 55, and the possible
additional rights, see infra notes 56, 57, the relevant state law defers to school boards “in
consultation with the teachers and parents of the school district” to “prescribe rules for
the discipline, suspension and expulsion of pupils,” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-843(B)
(2008). However, the law sets the procedural minimum only for suspensions of more
than ten days and merely mandates that the rules be “consistent with the constitutional
rights of pupils.” Id.
55. In requiring the superintendent to notify the school board within five days of
all suspensions, the legislation implies that the suspending administrator provide notice
to the superintendent. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-843(K).
56. Quaere whether the connected requirement that the suspension be for “good
cause” implies a right of appeal to the school board. Id. The related requirement for
access to specified board proceedings, see infra note 57, does not necessarily add to this
arguable right; if the legislature intended that any board proceeding for suspensions be
discretionary—in contrast with the explicit right to a board hearing for expulsions—the
access right is only conditional, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-843(G).
57. For suspensions and expulsions, the legislation also accords the student,
parents, and their legal counsel the right to attend and have access to the minutes or
recording of “any executive session pertaining to the proposed disciplinary action.”
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-843(H).
58. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-507(f)(1) (2007).
59. The Arkansas legislation only allows for appeals to the school board if the
superintendent initiates the suspension. Id. § 6-18-507(c)(2).
60. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48911 (West 2009).
61. In addition to requiring written notice to the parents regarding the suspension
decision, at the time of the decision, the suspending administrator must make reasonable
efforts to contact the parents in person or by telephone. Id. § 48911(d).
62. The administrator must have an informal conference with not only the student,
but also “whenever practicable, [with] the teacher, supervisor, or [referring] school
employee.” Id. § 48911(b).
63. Id.
64. Quaere whether the requirement that the suspending administrator report the
suspension—with the reason for the suspension—to the superintendent or board implies
a right of appeal to said level. Id. § 48911(e).
65. California law treats suspensions of six days or more as expulsions, which
separately have more formal rights, including, inter alia, written notice and a hearing
with right to counsel. Id. §§ 48911(a), 48918.
66. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-33-105 (2008).
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67. The Colorado legislation requires, as a prerequisite to the suspended student’s
readmission, a meeting between the student, parent, and suspending administrator to
discuss the “need to develop a remedial discipline plan for the pupil in an effort to
prevent further disciplinary action.” Id. § 22-33-105(3)(b)(II).
68. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-233c (Supp. 2008).
69. Connecticut law requires providing the student with the reasons for the
suspension, which equate more with notice of the charges than an explanation of the
evidence. Id. § 10-233c(a).
70. The state law provides that “no pupil shall be suspended more than ten times or
a total of fifty days in one school year, whichever results in fewer days of exclusion,
unless such pupil is granted a formal hearing.” Id. Additionally and more significantly,
an amendment to said statute, effective July 1, 2008, requires that schools replace out-ofschool suspensions—as contrasted with expulsions—with in-school suspensions, except
when the administration determines that the student “poses such a danger to persons or
property or such a disruption of the educational process” to justify out-of-school
suspension. Id. § 10-233c(g). The state education agency, pursuant to the directive in
the amendment, has issued guidelines for this determination. CONN. STATE DEP’T OF
EDUC., GUIDELINES FOR IN-SCHOOL AND OUT-OF-SCHOOL SUSPENSIONS 1 (2008),
available at http://www.sde.ct.gov/sde/lib/sde/pdf/pressroom/In_School_Suspension_
Guidance.pdf. Finally and peripherally, a Connecticut regulation requires “prompt
referral to a planning and placement team of all children who have been suspended
repeatedly.” CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 10-76d-7 (2008).
71. The state law provides that “no pupil shall be suspended more than ten times or
a total of fifty days in one school year, whichever results in fewer days of exclusion,
unless such pupil is granted a formal hearing.” Id. § 10-233c(a).
72. Delaware does not have relevant legislation or regulations. More specifically,
“Delaware has not enacted any statutory or regulatory provisions which either repeat or
add to the Goss notice and hearing requirements.” E-mail from Mary L. Cooke, Deputy
Att’y Gen., Del., to Perry A. Zirkel, Professor of Educ. and Law, Lehigh Univ. (June 13,
2008) (on file with second author). Previously, the state education department issued
nonbinding guidelines that recommended oral notice and a written decision that included
the charges, evidence, sanction, and right to internal appeal, first to the superintendent,
then to the board. WILLIAM B. KEENE, DEL. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION,
GUIDELINES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF DISTRICT POLICIES ON STUDENT RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES 10–11 (1988), available at http://www.doe.k12.de.us/infosuites/
students_family/climate/files/climate_Codes_Conduct_1992.pdf. However, recently the
state education department issued its intention, see 12 Del. Reg. Regs. 219 (Aug. 1,
2008), available at http://regulations.delaware.gov/register/august2008/final/12%20DE
%20Reg%20219%2008-01-08.pdf, to amend title 14, section 605 of the Delaware
Administrative Code, which requires school districts to keep local rights and responsibilities
policies on file with the state department of education, so as to delete reference to these
guidelines, DEL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 605 (2008), available at http://regulations.
delaware.gov/AdminCode/title14/600/605.pdf.
73. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.09(1)(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2009).
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74. Florida’s legislation requires the suspending administrator to make “a good
faith effort to immediately inform a student’s parent by telephone” and to report the
suspension and its reason “within 24 hours to the student’s parent by United States
mail.” Id.
75. This requirement also applies to school bus suspensions. Id.
76. Florida also requires the principal or the principal’s designee to make a “good
faith effort . . . to employ parental assistance or other alternative measures prior to
suspension, except in the case of emergency or disruptive conditions which require
immediate suspension or in the case of a serious breach of conduct as defined by rules of
the district school board.” Id. Additionally, Florida, by regulation, has special provisions for
suspension of students who are prosecuted for a felony off school property that has an
adverse impact on the educational process. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 6A-1.0956 (2008).
77. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-738 (2005). In line with its specific provisions, see
infra notes 78–79, this statute authorizes the principal or the principal’s designee to
suspend the student “consistent with any applicable procedural requirements of the
Constitutions of the United States and this state and after considering the use of any
appropriate student support services,” GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-738(e)(1).
78. The written notice and other Goss-plus protections are a requisite step after the
teacher’s removal of the student from class. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-2-738(b), (c).
Arguably, these minimums would seem to implicitly apply when an administrator
removes the student from school. See id. § 20-2-738(e)(2).
79. §§ 20-2-738(b), (c).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. In addition to the notable right of a teacher to remove a child from the
classroom, the Georgia statute also establishes a placement review committee that serves
as an intermediate step between the teacher’s removal of the student and the exercise of
the principal’s suspension options. Id. §§ 20-2-738(d), (e).
83. HAW. CODE R. §§ 8-19-6, -8 (Weil 2008).
84. The rules require the school to provide the parents with initial notice by
telephone “if feasible” and, upon completion of the required investigation, written notice.
Id. § 8-19-8(d). In addition, the rules require the principal “to attempt to confirm the
[written] notice by telephoning the parent.” Id. Although unclear whether it repeats the
first step or serves as an intermediate step, the rules also require the principal to notify
the parents “[u]pon preliminary investigation and findings.” Id. § 8-19-8(a).
85. The required elements of the written parental notice include a statement “[t]hat
the parent may request a conference with the principal or designee,” thus providing the
parent with at least an equivalent right. Id. § 8-19-8(d)(4).
86. Id.
87. Hawaii’s rules trigger the more formal procedural protections of expulsion
upon the accumulation of eleven or more days of suspension. Id. § 8-19-8(c).
88. For the Goss-type notice and hearing for the student, the rules require the
principal to request the parents to participate “where the student is unable to understand
the seriousness of the charges, the nature of the proceedings, and consequences thereof,
or is of such age, intelligence or experience as to make meaningful discussion difficult.”
Id. § 8-19-8(b). More generally, the rules require counseling of the student in connection
with each suspension. Id. § 8-19-6(g).
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89. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-205 (2008). We acknowledge with appreciation the
assistance of attorney Elaine Eberharter-Maki in ascertaining the pertinent state law of
Idaho. E-mail from Elaine Eberharter-Maki, Att’y, Eberharter-Maki & Tappen’s Boise,
Idaho Office, to Perry A. Zirkel, Professor of Educ. and Law, Lehigh Univ. (June 9,
2008) (on file with second author).
90. “The board of trustees [of the school district] shall be notified of any temporary
suspensions, the reasons therefor, and the response, if any, thereto.” § 33-205.
91. The required “informal hearing” specifies that the principal must provide the
student with the reasons for the suspension, which—corresponding more closely to the
charges—do not necessarily equate fully with an explanation of the evidence. Id.
92. Similarly, the requirement is “the opportunity to challenge [the] reasons.” Id.
93. At any one of the following applicable limits, the more formal notice and
hearing requirements for an expulsion apply: (1) the principal suspends the student for
more than five days; (2) the superintendent extends the suspension by an additional ten
days; or (3) the school board extends the suspension by an additional five days because
the suspended student poses a risk to the health, welfare, or safety of other pupils. Id.
94. ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/10-22.6(b) (West 2006).
95. The notice to the student’s parents or guardian must include “a full statement
of the reasons for [] suspension and a notice of their right to [school board] review.” Id.
96. As in Idaho, see supra note 91, this right appears to be partial, based on the
connected notice-of-reasons requirement, § 5/10-22.6(b).
97. If the parents exercise this required appeals opportunity, then they have the
right to appear and participate at the school board review. § 5/10-22.6(b).
98. IND. CODE ANN. § 20-33-8-18(b) (West 2008).
99. IOWA CODE § 282.4(1) (West 1996 & Supp. 2008).
100. This procedural requirement is the only one specified in the Iowa legislation and—
along with the teacher’s, principal’s, and superintendent’s authorities for suspensions—
the requirement is conditioned upon the school board’s delegation. Id.
101. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8902(b), (c) (2002).
102. In addition to the immediate oral notice, the legislation requires that written
notice, including the reasons for suspension, be given to the student and the student’s
parent within twenty-four hours. Id. § 72-8902(c).
103. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.150(5), (6) (West 2006 & Supp. 2008).
104. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:416 (2001 & Supp. 2009).
105. Id. § 17:416(C).
106. The Maine legislation merely requires “proper investigation of a student’s
behavior” and “due process proceedings” for student suspensions and expulsions.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 1001(9) (2008).
107. The Maryland legislation only provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he student or
the student’s parent or guardian promptly shall be given a conference with the principal
and any other appropriate personnel during the suspension period.” MD. CODE ANN.,
EDUC. § 7-305(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2006).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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111. Id.
112. The Maryland regulations provide a narrowly circumscribed right to appeal to
the State Board of Education. MD. CODE REGS. 13A.01.05.05 (2009).
113. The Massachusetts legislation generally requires each school district to have
policies that provide “disciplinary proceedings, including procedures assuring due process”
and “standards and procedures for suspension and expulsion of students.” MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 37H (West 1996).
114. This legislation only specifies procedural prerequisites in cases of student
felonies. Id. § 37H1/2.
115. Michigan’s legislation authorizes the school board and administrators to suspend
students for “gross misdemeanor or persistent disobedience,” but it does not specify any
relevant procedural prerequisites. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1311(1) (West 2005 &
Supp. 2008). Michigan has a separate statute that authorizes teachers to suspend students
from a class, subject, or activity. Id. § 380.1309. Although this statute unusually allows
such action “for up to 1 full school day,” id., the chart does not include the specified
procedural requirements due to the aforementioned exclusion, see supra note 17 and
accompanying text.
116. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 121A.46 (West 2008).
117. The written notice, which must be served on the student at or before the time
the suspension is to take effect, must include “the grounds for suspension, a brief
statement of the facts, a description of the testimony, a readmission plan, and a copy of
the [relevant statutory provisions].” Id. § 121A.46(3).
118. The district must make reasonable efforts to notify parents by telephone as
soon as possible and must send the parents a copy of the student’s written notice within
forty-eight hours. Id.
119. For suspensions beyond five days, the suspending administrator must provide
the superintendent with a reason for the suspension. Id. § 121A.41(10). Moreover, if the
suspension, whatever its length, would result in the student missing more than ten
cumulative days in a school year, the district must make reasonable efforts to meet with
the student and the student’s parent, and with the parent’s permission, conduct a mental
health screening of the student. Id. § 121A.45(3).
120. The readmission plan, which is treated as permissive in this part of the
statute—although subsequently seemingly mandatory by implication, see supra note
117—“must not obligate a parent to provide a sympathomimetic medication for the
parent’s child as a condition of readmission,” § 121A.41(10).
121. Mississippi’s legislation requires each school board to adopt a code of student
conduct, including “[p]rocedures to be followed for acts requiring discipline, including
suspensions and expulsion, which comply with due process requirements.” MISS. CODE
ANN. § 37-11-55 (1999 & Supp. 2007).
122. The Missouri legislation uses the term suspension generically—without any
mention of expulsion—for removals for up to 180 days, distinguishing procedurally
between those for up to ten days and those for more than ten days only indirectly in
terms of the respective authority of principals and superintendents. MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 167.171 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008). The requirements coded herein are those for
removals by the principal, thus suspensions of up to ten days. Id.
123. Id. § 167.171(2).
124. Id. § 167.161(1).
125. Id.
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126. § 167.171(2).
127. Id.
128. Id. § 167.171(1). This right of appeal is a de facto result of the requirement
that suspensions by the principals—those up to ten days—be “immediately reported to
the superintendent who may revoke [them] at any time.” Id.
129. Additionally, a separate statute provides specific hearing requirements for a
pupil who “poses a threat of harm to such pupil or others, as evidenced by the prior
conduct of such pupil.” § 167.161(1).
130. The specifically relevant provision in the Montana legislation merely requires
the school board to “adopt a policy defining the authority and procedure to be used . . . in
suspending a pupil.” MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-5-202 (2007); see id. §§ 20-4-402, -4-403,
-5-202. The only other procedural provision is for the limited situation in which a school
does not have a superintendent or principal, whereupon the teacher has the authority to
suspend the student, but it must “notify the trustees and the county superintendent
immediately of the action.” Id. § 20-4-302(5).
131. Montana’s regulations require that each school “maintain a record of any
disciplinary action that is educationally related [including suspensions], with explanation,
taken against the student.” MONT. ADMIN. R. 10.55.910 (2007).
132. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-265 (2003).
133. The principal must send written notice to the student and the parent within
twenty-four hours of the suspension. Id.
134. Without further differentiation for suspensions exceeding ten days, the statute
provides that suspensions exceeding five days require more formal procedural protections,
including the right to a formal hearing with counsel and witnesses. Id. § 79-268.
135. Prior to a “short-term” suspension, the principal must make “an investigation
of the alleged conduct or violation and [determine] that such suspension is necessary to
help any student, to further school purposes, or to prevent an interference with school
purposes.” Id. § 79-265(b)(2). Prior to the end of the suspension, the principal must
make “a reasonable effort to hold a conference with the parent or guardian before or at
the time the student returns to school.” Id. § 79-265(b)(5).
136. NEV. REV. STAT. § 392.467(2) (2007).
137. The legislation that authorizes student suspensions does not specify procedural
prerequisites. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193:13 (LexisNexis 2006).
138. N.J ADMIN. CODE § 6A:16-7.2 (2008).
139. The school must provide this parental notice prior to the end of the school day
on which the administrator makes the suspension decision. Id. § 6A:16-7.2(a)(3).
Additionally, the notice has various required elements, and it must include “[t]he
provision(s) of the code of student conduct the student is accused of violating” as well as
“[t]he student’s due process rights, pursuant to [the state regulations].” Id.
140. The chief school administrator must report the suspension to the district board
of education at its next regular meeting. Id. § 6A:16-7.2(b).
141. The chief school administrator must annually report specified discipline
information, including the number of suspensions, to both the local and the state board of
education. Id. § 6A:16-7.1(a).
142. N.M. CODE R. § 6.11.2.12(D)(2) (Weil 2001).
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143. The relevant regulation provides:
The school shall exert reasonable efforts to inform the student’s parent of the
charges against the student and their possible or actual consequence as soon as
practicable. If the school has not communicated with the parent by telephone
or in person by the end of the first full day of suspension, the school shall on
that day mail a written notice with the required information to the parent’s
address of record.
Id.
144. The regulations clarify that the suspending administrator “is not required to
divulge the identity of informants, although (s)he should not withhold such information
without good cause.” Id.
145. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3214 (McKinney Supp. 2009).
146. New York provides the student and parents with the right, upon request, to “an
informal conference with the principal at which the pupil and/or person in parental
relation shall be authorized to present the pupil’s version of the event and to ask
questions of the complaining witnesses.” Id. § 3214(3)(b)(1).
147. New York law treats suspensions of six days or more effectively as expulsions,
according expelled students the rights, inter alia, of “reasonable notice,” legal
representation, and cross-examination. Id. § 3214(3)(c)(1). New York does not have
any subsequent, differentiating level for removals of more than ten days.
148. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-391(b) (2007).
149. The statute clarifies that “[t]he notice [to the parents] shall be given by telephone,
telefax, e-mail, or any other method reasonably designed to achieve actual notice.” Id.
150. Without specifying any procedural requirements, North Dakota’s statute
delegates authority to school boards to develop rules regarding suspensions and
expulsions. N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-19-09 (Supp. 2007).
151. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.66(A) (West Supp. 2007).
152. The legislation provides students with the opportunity to appear at an informal
hearing to “challenge the reason for the intended suspension or otherwise to explain
[their] actions.” Id.
153. Id. § 3313.661(A).
154. The Oklahoma legislation requires districts to develop policies, including
procedures, for student suspensions, but the only specified procedure is the right of
appeal to a district panel. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 24-101.3 (West 2005 & Supp.
2009).
155. Districts must create a policy that determines an appeals panel for suspension
and expulsions. Id. § 24-101.3(A). The panel may be a committee made up of teachers,
district administrators, or both, or the panel may be the district board of education. Id.
§ 24-101.3(B)(1).
156. OR. ADMIN. R. 581-021-0065 (2008).
157. This notice must include “the conditions for reinstatement, and appeal
procedures, where applicable.” Id.
158. Oregon’s regulations require “specification of [the] charges,” which does not
appear to equate fully to an explanation of the evidence. Id.
159. The regulations provide the school board, not the parent, with the right of final
review, and this is seemingly only when the “executive officer of the school district or
designated representative” makes the suspension decision. Id.
160. 22 PA. CODE §§ 12.6(b), 12.8(b), (c) (2009).
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161. Pennsylvania’s regulations require providing the student with the reasons for
the suspension, which equate more with notice of the charges than an explanation of the
evidence. Id. § 12.6(b).
162. For suspensions of four to ten days, the regulations require providing an
informal conference among the student, the parent, and the principal within the first five
days of the suspension. Id. §§ 12.6(b)(1)(iv), 12.8(c). This “hearing” must include the
right to question witnesses present and to produce witnesses on the student’s behalf. Id.
§ 12.8(c). The regulations provide a further, more formal level of hearing for removals
of more than ten days. Id. § 12.8(b).
163. Rhode Island’s “safe school” legislation authorizes the school committee, or a
school principal as designated by the school committee, to suspend “disruptive” students,
but it does not specify the procedural requirements beyond a multistep right of appeal.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-2-17(a), (b) (1996). The legislation includes a definition of
“disruptive.” Id. § 16-2-17(a).
164. When the delegated school principal issues the suspension, the statute is not
clear whether there is a right to appeal to the board. It may be alternatively argued that
the principal and the board for such action are effectively the same or that the specified
higher levels imply full exhaustion from the principal to the board. Id. § 16-2-17(b); see
infra note 165.
165. The Rhode Island legislation provides the successive appellate rights to “the
[state] commissioner of elementary and secondary education,” “the [state] board of
regents for elementary and secondary education,” and “the family court for the county in
which the school is located.” § 16-2-17(b).
166. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-230 (2004).
167. Written notice must include the reasons for the suspension and provide the
parents with an opportunity for a meeting with the administrator within three days of the
suspension. Id.
168. The aforementioned meeting with the administrator must be exhausted to
trigger this right to appeal to “the board of trustees or to its authorized agent.” Id.
169. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 13-32-4, -4.2 (2004).
170. After stating that school boards “may authorize the summary suspension of
pupils by principals of schools for not more than ten school days,” South Dakota’s
legislation then appears to give the superintendent, not the parent, the right of review,
specifically providing: “Any suspension by a principal shall be immediately reported to
the superintendent who may revoke the suspension at any time.” Id. § 13-32-4.2.
171. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-3401(a) to (c) (2002 & Supp. 2007).
172. The required notice to both the parents and the superintendent must include
“[t]he cause for the suspension” and “[t]he conditions for readmission, which may include, at
the request of either party, a meeting of the parent or guardian, student and principal.”
Id. § 49-6-3401(c).
173. The required information is limited to “the nature of the student’s misconduct.”
Id.
174. As a prerequisite to suspension, the legislation additionally requires the
suspending administrator’s affirmative act of questioning the student. Id.
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175. The legislation provides as follows: “If the suspension is for more than five (5)
days, the principal shall develop and implement a plan for improving the behavior which
shall be made available for review by the [superintendent] upon request.” Id.
176. TEXAS EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 37.001, 37.005, 37.009 (Vernon 2006). We
acknowledge with appreciation the assistance of attorney Christopher Borreca in
confirming that Texas legislation focuses its procedural protections on suspensions of
more than two days. E-mail from Chris Borreca, Att’y, Houston Office of Thompson &
Horton, LLP, to Perry A. Zirkel, Professor of Educ. and Law, Lehigh Univ. (May 28,
2008) (on file with second author).
177. Texas’s legislation requires the school board to “address the notification of a
student’s parent or guardian of a violation of the student code of conduct committed by
the student that results in suspension.” TEXAS EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.001(a)(6) (Vernon
2006).
178. The legislation leaves the right of appeal within the discretion of the district
via its policy. Id. § 37.009(a).
179. For suspensions of three to ten days, Texas legislation provides:
[T]he principal or other appropriate administrator shall schedule a conference
among the principal or other appropriate administrator, a parent or guardian of
the student, the teacher removing the student from class, if any, and the student. At
the conference, the student is entitled to written or oral notice of the reasons for
the removal, an explanation of the basis for the removal, and an opportunity to
respond to the reasons for the removal. The student may not be returned to the
regular classroom pending the conference.
Id.
180. Utah’s legislation delegates suspension policies to school boards “consistent
with due process and other provisions of law,” with the only specifically required
procedure being notice to the custodial parent. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-903 (2006 &
Supp. 2008).
181. Additionally, the legislation requires notice to the noncustodial parent
upon written request from such parent. Id. § 53A-11-903(1)(b)(i).
182. Vermont legislation simply provides “standard due process procedures for
suspension and expulsion of a student.” VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1161a(a)(7) (2004).
The only exception is the specific requirement that the school’s discipline plan include
procedures for “notifying parents of student misconduct.” Id. § 1161a(a)(3).
183. § 1161a(a)(3).
184. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-277.04 (2006).
185. It is not clear whether the school board policy may limit this right, given the
following language in the statute: “The decision of the division superintendent or his
designee may be appealed to the school board or a committee thereof in accordance with
regulations of the school board . . . .” Id.
186. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 392-400-245, -250 (2007).
187. Washington’s regulations require that the notice also include an explanation of
“the corrective action or punishment which may be imposed.” Id. § 392-400-250.
188. The regulations additionally provide that “[a]ny student, parent, or guardian
who is aggrieved by the imposition of [a short-term suspension] shall have the right to an
informal conference with the building principal or his or her designee for the purpose of
resolving the grievance.” Id. § 392-400-240; see also id. § 392-400-245 (referring to
short-term suspensions).
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189. The student or parent may appeal successively to the principal, the superintendent,
and then the school board. § 392-400-240.
190. The regulations in one part separate suspensions into those for one day and
those for more than one day—presumably two to ten days—with the only distinction
appearing to be with regard to the parent’s right to notice and an informal conference. Id.
§ 392-400-250(2). Yet, the prefatory part of the same regulation seems to provide these rights,
by cross-reference, for suspensions of one to ten days generally. See § 392-400-250.
191. The regulations condition suspensions on “a general rule”: “[N]o student shall
be suspended unless another form of corrective action or punishment reasonably
calculated to modify [the student’s] conduct has previously been imposed upon the
student as a consequence of misconduct of the same nature.” Id. § 392-400-245(2). This
requirement has a provision for exceptional circumstances, which includes the school
district’s consultation with an ad hoc citizens committee. Id. The regulations also limit the
total number of days a student may be suspended based on age: students in kindergarten
through grade four may miss no more than ten days per semester or trimester, while
students in grades five and above may miss no more than fifteen days per semester or
trimester. Id. § 392-400-245(4) to (5). Finally, the regulations expressly permit school
boards to establish one or more “student disciplinary boards composed of students,
teachers, administrators, or parents, or any combination thereof.” Id. § 392-400-220.
192. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18A-5-1a(d) (LexisNexis 2007).
193. The legislation specifically provides that the parent “shall be given telephonic
notice, if possible, of this informal hearing, which notice shall briefly state the grounds
for suspension.” Id. The legislation also requires that written notice be sent to the parent
on the same day the suspension was decided upon “by regular United States mail.” Id.
194. The legislation additionally requires that the written notice be provided to “the
county superintendent and to the faculty senate of the school.” Id.
195. Not appearing to distinguish procedurally between suspensions of one to ten
days and expulsions or other removals beyond ten consecutive days, the legislation
provides for a board hearing with the various associated more formal protections,
including the right to counsel. Id. § 18A-5-1a(f). In the case of a suspension, this
proceeding is inferably by way of an appeal. Id.
196. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 120.13(1) (West 2004).
197. The requirement for parental notice when a teacher removes the student from
class suggests that the same requirement exists when a student is suspended from school.
Id. § 120.13(1)(a)(4).
198. The required information is “the reason for the proposed suspension,” which
does not equate fully with an explanation of the evidence. Id. § 120.13(1)(b)(3).
199. The legislation limits suspensions to no more than five days for certain
offenses, but it does not specify additional procedural prerequisites until the expulsion
stage. Id. § 120.13(1)(b)(2).
200. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-4-305 (2007).
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